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TIE PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY, GENTLEMEN OF THE FACULTY,
STUDENTS OF LAW, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:
The Yale Bicentennial celebration, recently so happily concluded,
and with so much honor, served to bring into prominence the circum-
stances which attended the founding of the College, and, among
others, the difficulties and perplexities which were experienced in
regard to the charter. The colonial legislature of Massachusetts
had granted in 1636 a charter to Harvard, and was adjudged in
consequence by the English High Court of Chancery in 1684 to have
committed an act of usurpation. This was one of the grounds for
the forfeiture of the charter of Massachusetts. The English courts
did not recognize the colonies in America as public governments,
but as trading corporations, and therefore denied their right to
create private corporations. The good men in Connecticut accord-
ingly took the advice of astute counsel, and when their colonial
legislature was asked in i7OI for authority to establish the College
they saw to it that the bill was prepared as free as possible of any
expressions indicating that it was what it was intended to be.'
*An Inaugural Address delivered November I, igoi, by Henry Wade
Rogers, LL. D., Professor of Corporations and Equity in the Law School
of Yale University.
' See Baldwin's Modem Political Institutions, note 4, page 184, citing
Papers of the New Haven Colony Historical Society, vol. 3, P. 413.
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They then undoubtedly realized how important it was to have
some knowledge of the law of corporations. This did not lead
them, however, to establish at once a law school in connection with
the new institution. No law school existed at that time within the
country, nor was one established until long after. Perhaps the need
for one was not particularly urgent, inasmuch as it is very
doubtful whether men could then have earned a living in the law.
The legal profession had not at that time really come into existenze in
the new world.
Not until the College was one hundred and twenty-five years old
do we find any mention made of a law school connected with it.
The catalogue of 1826 announces that "A course of lectures is
delivered by the Professor of Law on all the titles and subjects of
the Common and Statute Law." It contains, however, no specific
statement of the subjects taught, or the text-books used. Not until
1869 did it indicate what books were used, and in the statement then
made, no mention is found of a text-book on corporations. But in
1876 the subject of "Corporations" is mentioned for the first time,
and made a part of the graduate course. In 1879 the subject was
divided and "Private Corporations" became a part of the under-
graduate course. Public Corporations continued in the graduate
course until 1896, when it was transferred to the undergraduate
course.' It thus appears to be within twenty-five years that it has
been deemed essential to make distinct provision at Yale for instruc-
tion in this subject, now conceded to be one of the most important
branches ol the law. Heretofore the subjects of Public and Private
Corporations, now united in the same chair, have been taught by
different instructors. To this professorship also belongs Equity
jurisprudence. In speaking exclusively of Corporations on this
occasion I am not unmindful that to the lawyer Equity is an equally
important and interesting department of jurisprudence.
A corporation is a juristic as distinguished from a natural person.
It is an association of individuals, created under authority of law,
'Lectures on the subject of Public Corporations were, however, given in
the undergraduate course from -885 to 1896. But the chief work in the
subject was done in the graduate course where Dillon on Municipal Corpora-
tions was used as a text-book, having been adopted as such in 1883. In i879
Angell and Ames was adopted as the text-book for the work in "Corpora-
tions." It was adopted as a text-book in the Harvard Law School in 1834.
The catalogues of Columbia down to 1877-78 make no mention of Corpora-
tions as a distinctive subject in the Law School course of that University.
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and which for many purposes the law treats as if it were itself a
person. This idea of a corporation as a legal entity, distinct from
the members who compose it, was an invention of the Romans.
The idea was not clearly developed in early Roman law, but during
the Republic it became better defined, and the classical jurists fully
recognized the corporate obligation and the exemption of the mem-
bers from individual liability.'
A distinguished member of the faculty of the Yale Law School
has remarked: "That the Romans made the world over again, but
among their many achievements none was more durable in its
effects on the civilization of mankind than the invention of the cor-
poration as an instrument of government and of trade." 2
Ecclesiastical and municipal bodies kept alive this Roman con-
ception, and when the English lawyers came to deal with such
associations they applied to them the principles which they found in
the Roman law. It has even been said that in no other department
of the law did they borrow so copiously and so directly from the
civil law. Yet it must be admitted that while the conception was taken
"full grown" from the law of Rome, the idea has been developed
since with great fullness and ingenuity by the courts of England and
the United States.
Old as is the conception of a corporation as an artificial entity
distinct from the persons composing it, the law relating to it is
nevertheless essentially a development of recent years. Indeed no
branch of municipal law has shown greater or more rapid develop-
ment during the last half century. The subject has been the occa-
sion of much legislation, both constitutional and statutory. It has
given rise to an immense amount of litigation which has not been
equalled in quantity nor surpassed in importance in any other
department of private law. The questions involved have been as
novel and difficult as any which the courts have had before them
for solution. A comparison of the court reports at the beginning
and close of the past century will make it evident that the character
of the litigation of the country has been revolutionized in conse-
quence of the development of corporations. The first term of the
Supre~ie Court of the United States was held in February, 1790.
From that time to the year 18oo the Court had before it but a single
'Howe's Studies in the Civil Law, pp. 65, 66.
2 Baldwin's Modem Political Institutions, p. 141.
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corporation case. At the October term of I899-from October,
1899 to October, I9oo-the Court filed opinions in 164 civil cases,
exclusive of those to which a public corporation was a party. In
97 of these cases, more than one-half of the whole number, a
private corporation was a party. The first volume of Johnson's
Reports gives the decisions of the New York Supreme Court, for
the year i8o6, in 13o cases. Only 20 of this number involved any
kind of corporation, public or private. In the four volumes which
contain the decisions of the New York Court of Appeals for the
year ending May I, 19O1, are the opinions in 222 civil cases, exclusive
of those to which a public corporation was a party. In 102 of these
cases, nearly one-half of the whole number, a private corporation
appeared as plaintiff or defendant.
The corporations known to the earlier English law were mainly
the municipal, the ecclesiastical, and the educational and eleemosy-
nary. To all of these originally, the same principles appear to have
been applied. It was only in the course of time that differences in
the rules of law applicable to each developed, due to the different
purposes for which they were designed.
The fundamental distinction of corporations into public and
private is nowhere mentioned by Blackstone in his Commentaries,
and does not appear to have been known to him when he wrote in
1765. At that time municipal corporations were hardly distinguish-
able in their legal aspect from private corporations. The cities and
boroughs of England were then organized on the same model as the
private corporations and they so continued until the Municipal
Reform Act of 1835. The distinctions between public and private
corporations are largely a development of American law.
The law relating to public or municipal corporations attained
importance first in point of time, and that part of the law of private
corporations with which lawyers are to-day chiefly concerned has
been the latest in development. The first book on the law of cor-
porations was Kyd's work published in 1793. It related altogether
to municipal corporations. The first American book on corporations
was that of Angell and Ames, published in 1831. In all the books
that had been published in England up to that time, and even in
the work of Angell and Ames, hardly an allusion will be found to
commercial corporations. The commercial corporation, as it now
exists, had not then developed to any considerable extent. Its history
in this country really begins about 185o. The first general incor-
poration act under which corporations could be formed for business
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purposes was the one passed in New York as early as i8I1. But
it was limited in its terms to a few specified industries, and it was
not until 1848 that the "Manufacturing Corporation Act" was
passed in that State, which by its terms was made applicable to
associations formed for manufacturing, mining, mechanical, chemi-
cal, agricultural, horticultural, medical, mercantile or commercial
purposes. New Jersey, two years before, had passed an act for the
formation of business corporations. This act, it is said, was the first
to make a general provision for the aggregation of capital for the
purpose of carrying on business without personal liability.'
An examination of the list of American charters granted for
business purposes prior to I8OO,2 shows that few indeed were granted
for any business purpose and scarcely any for manufacturing pur-
poses. None were granted for the latter purpose by Delaware,
Georgia, Maryland, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont and Virginia.
Kentucky and New Jersey each incorporated one. Connecticut in
1732 incorporated "The New London Society United for Trade and
Commerce in Connecticut," but the charter was repealed the next
year. Its only other like charter was to the "Company of the Con-
necticut Silk Manufacturers," granted in 1789. New York had
incorporated two manufacturing "societies," and in addition a
"Society for the Promotion of Agriculture, Arts and Manufactures."
Three charters were granted in Massachusetts to manufacturing
corporations. The colonial legislatures seem to have granted but
three charters to corporations for business purposes prior to 1741,
when Parliament intervened and prohibited for the future any
similar American grants. Between i8oo and 1850 the number of
corporations increased slowly as public sentiment was long adverse
in this country as in England to the grant of corporate privileges.
The opinion expressed by Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations
that manufacturing corporations scarce ever fail to do more harm
than good was still more or less dominant in the public mind of
both countries. This conviction, however, seems to have lost its
potency in the United States before it did in England. For Chan-
cellor Kent in his Commentaries speaks of the propensity in modern
times to multiply civil corporations, "especially in the United States,"
'See Mr. Keasbey's paper on New Jersey and the Great Corporations,
Reports of Am. Bar Ass., vol. 22, p. 386.
2 See Two Centuries' Growth of American Law, p. z)6.
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where he says they have increased "in a rapid manner and to a most
astonishing extent."' In the only corporation case before the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1827, Mr. Justice Duncan in
declaring a foreign attachment act inapplicable to a foreign corpora-
tion, remarked: "It is intended for our home made corporations, of
which Pennsylvania is an extensive manufacturer, and not for exotic
plants, articles of foreign origin and growth."' In 1857, in a case
before the Supreme Court of Illinois, Mr. Justice Caton declared
it probably true "that more corporations were created by the legis-
lature of Illinois at its last session, than existed in the whole civilized
world" in i8oo.3 But the number of corporations created in Illinois
in 1857 was insignificant as compared with the number now being
formed every year in some of the States of the Union.
The number incorporated in New York in 19oo was one thousand
eight hundred and sixty-four. In New Jersey the number during
the same year was two thousand one hundred and eighty-one,
almost all holding under charters perpetual in time. Perhaps it
should be mentioned, however, that in the case of one the limit was
modestly fixed at one thousand years, and in three others, slightly
more modest at nine hundred and ninety-nine years. In the same
state during the fiscal year 19O1, the number of new corporations
chartered has been 2,342. In New York the fiscal year closed on
September 3o, and the Comptroller of the State has announced that
the receipts for the year from the corporation tax law amounted
to $4,966,680.93. More than 6,ooo corporations were taxed in the
State during the year. In New Jersey the fees paid for registering
the charters of incorporation filed in that State in 1899 amounted to
$725,131, and during the present fiscal year to $558,369.54.
How much of the wealth of the country is now in the possession
of the corporations it is quite impossible to say. The Standard Oil
Company has outstanding capital of about $97,500,00o, the market
value of which is about $683,ooo,ooo. The United States Steel
corporation has $i,o18,oooooo of stock capital, having a market
value to-day of $693,1oo,ooo. It has in addition $300,000,000 bonds
outstanding, and other issues on subsidiary property. These two
corporations alone are possessed of property so enormous in value
12 Kent's Comm., 272.
* Bushel v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 15 S. & R. 173, 186.
* Railroad Co. v. Dalby, 19 Ill., 353.
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as to be quite incomprehens'lble. I Some years ago Abram S. Hewitt
stated that private corporations already owned from one-third to one-
half of the capital of the civilized world. In 1887 a distinguished
authority in economics declared it within the bounds of moderation to
estimate the wealth of corporations in the United States as one-fourth.
of the total value of all property in the country. He declared that the
rapidly increasing proportion of all the resources of the country
belonging to corporations was a most significant fact. Another
authority about the same time estimated the wealth of corporations as
increasing three or four times as rapidly as those of private con-
cerns.2 Since these statements were made the wealth of corpora-
tions has been enormously increased, and out of all proportion to
any previous period in our history. It is perhaps within bounds to
say that the corporations of the United States now possess the
greater part of the personal, and no small part of the real property,
of the country. The total capitalization of one hundred and
eighty-three industrial combinations recently formed is stated by the
census officials as alone amounting to $3,o85,2oo,868. At the time
the figures were compiled, the United States Steel Corporation had
not been organized. The wealth of the United States including real
and personal property was under the census of 189o , $65,037,-
091,197.c
The present importance of this subject in the United States is
due, not merely to the great number of corporations that have been
created and to the great wealth which they possess, but also to
the great number of men who are in the service of these corporate
organizations, and to the fact that they are conducting the greater
part of the business of the country and controlling a large part
of its wealth. The last report of the statistician to the Interstate
Commerce Commission shows that the American railway corpora-
tions alone had in their employ for the year ending June 3o , 19oo,
' Since this address was prepared there has been created under the laws
of New Jersey the Northern Securities Company. The capital of this com-
pany is $4oooooooo, quoted at early market prices at about $44o,ooo,ooo. The
three railways it controls have not less than $642,oo,0ooo outstanding bonds,
nearly all selling above par, and many considerably above par. The new
organization therefore is practically a billion dollar corporation, the property
it controls being not less than $I,o82,ooo,ooo.
2 See the article by Dr. R. T. Ely in Harper's Monthly, June, 1887.
cThe figures under the census of i9oo are not yet accessible.
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more than one million men.' According to the averages adopted in
such cases it is a fair estimate to say that not less than five million
individuals in the United States derive their support from the rail-
way corporations alone. The roads disbursed in wages in 19oo the
enormous sum of $577,264,841. The total amount of their disburse-
ments for the year for everything entering into operating expenses
was $961,V8,5ii. The aggregate amount of the capital invested
in the railroads of the country was $Ii,692,817,o66. The figures
given do not include the street railways in which an enormous
amount of capital is invested, and which give employment to an
army of men.
The law of corporations is a more important and extensive branch
of jurisprudence in the United States than in any of the other
countries of the world. It is conceded in England, I understand,
that American lawyers have dealt more satisfactorily with the sub-
ject than has the English bar. It is remarkable that no comprehen-
sive treatise has appeared in England on the subject of Private Cor-
porations, since Mr. Grant wrote his work in 185o, although a num-
ber have appeared on Municipal Corporations.2
The greater importance of this subject in this country is due in
part to the greater number of corporations which exist here, and
the more extensive operations which they carry on. The American
policy of providing general incorporation laws under which cor-
porate franchises may be obtained on equal terms by all who
wish them, has contributed to this result. In England it has not
always been possible to obtain corporate franchises with equal
freedom.
The English writer on the law of corporations, Mr. Grant, speaks
of a corporation as "an invention which, perhaps more than any
other human device has contributed to the civilization of Europe,
and the freedom of its States." I do not think that this tribute, high
as it is, is undeserved. He amply justifies it by saying that---"By
this means municipalities were furnished with a form of government
that never wore out; charitable trusts were secured to the objects
of them so long as such objects should continue to be found; the
protection and encouragement of trades and arts were permanently
provided for; and learning and religion kept alive and cherished in
'The exact number was 1,017,653.
2 Some works have been published on The Companies Act. There is
also the important work of Mr. Brice on Ultra Vires.
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times through which, probably, no other means can be mentioned
that would appear equally well qualified to preserve them."'
We cannot, however, ignore the fact that the civilization whicr.
the corporations have done so much to develop they have from time
to time done much to imperil. We know that at Rome their effect
on the social and economic life came at length to be evil. Gibbon
tells us that the Romans came to regard private corporations with
"the utmost jealousy and distrust."2 "Down with Corporations !"
became a familiar cry, and in the year 64 B. C. a statute was enacted
which dissolved most of them. They were afterwards revived. But
in the times of Julius Casar a restrictive policy was again adopted
respecting them. In England conveyances and devises to corpora-
tions, civil or ecclesiastical, were forbidden by the Great Charter;
and numerous statutes of mortmain, beginning in 1225 and running
down to the mortmain act passed in 1736, give evidence of hostile
feeling. In the United States the voices of not a few thoughtful
men have spoken, if not words of alarm, certainly words of caution,
as to the possible dangers which threaten us from corporate organiza-
tions. Mr. Justice Brown of the Supreme Court of the United
States in the address which he delivered before the graduating'class
of this Law School in 1895, named three perils which, in his opinion
menaced the immediate future of the country and even threatened
the stability of its institutions. Two of the three then mentioned
were municipal misgovernment and corporate greed. In the Bicen-
tennial Commemorative address of Mr. Justice Brewer, comment
was made upon the enormous financial consolidations of the present
time and the corresponding organizations of labor, and the opinion
was expressed that this centralizing tendency was antagonistic to the
Republic and not consistent with popular government.
The subject of corporations, both public and private, is to-day
commanding the profound attention of the lawyer and the statesman
alike. The power which private corporations possess is so great and
their capacity for mischief is so boundless that serious men have
realized the absolute necessity which exists in this country of devis-
ing restraints for the protection of society. Take by way of
example the railroad corporations. It is within their power to con-
struct the industrial map of the United States. They can practically
decree at what places any industry shall be conducted. As one
' Grant on Corporations, p. 4.
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, vol. 2, p. i68.
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writer has expressed it, railroad rates "have become the air which
industries breathe." The railroad, by the rates they make, can decide
whether the butter consumed in New York City shall be produced
in New York State or in Michigan, whether western merchants who
buy their goods in New York City shall have an advantage over those
who buy them in Boston or Philadelphia; whether the dairy pro-
ducts consumed in Chicago shall come from New York or Wisconsin.
The time was and probably still is when the railroads can dictate
not merely where industries can be carried on, but by whom they
can be carried on. In the case of the Standard Oil Company, it is
no secret that the great monopoly that Company possesses was
built up by discrimination in freight rates, made by the railroad com-
panies upon the demand of the Standard Oil Company in order to
crush out independent refiners. In the course of a year and a half
the Company received from the railroads, it is said, $io,ooo,ooo in
rebates. Congress, in 1887, created an Interstate Commerce Com-
mission with the view of regulating the roads, but gave the Com-
mission no power to enforce its findings. Under the law as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court the Commission has no authority to
declare what are reasonable rates or regulations, and it is practically
optional with the carrier whether the decisions of the Commission
shall be complied with. It seems inevitable that sooner or later it
will be found necessary to invest the Commission with power to
make changes in the rates when existing charges are found to be
unreasonable after a full hearing of all the parties in interest, and to
put the changes into immediate effect and continue them in force
until otherwise ordered by the courts on appeal. That there is a
growing sentiment throughout the country in favor of public owner-
ship of the roads cannot be denied. It is not likely to become pre-
dominant unless the people become convinced that no other method
will afford the necessary protection against unjust discriminations
and unreasonable rates.
The tendency of the times is in the direction of railway consolida-
tion. Congress made this inevitable when it undertook to suppress
pooling instead of allowing and regulating it. What has been said
indicates the danger which such consolidation involves. Mr. Justice
Cooley, at the time Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, alluded to the danger in an address he delivered in 1889
before the Merchants Association of Boston. Speaking of trusts,
he said:
"They are of course a feature of the tinges to which all thoughtful men
must now be giving some attention, but at this time I do not care to
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dogmatize on the subject. A few things can, nevertheless, be said of trusts
without danger of mistake. They are things to be feared. They antagonize
a leading and most valuable principle of industrial life in their attempt not
to curb competition merely, but to put an end to it. The course of the leading
trusts of the country has been such as to emphasize the fear of them, and
the benefits that have come from its cheapening of an article of commerce
are insignificant when contrasted with the mischiefs that have followed the
exhibitions in many forms of the merciless power of concentrated capital.
And when we witness the utterly heartless manner in which trusts some-
times have closed manufactories and turned men willing to be industrious
into the streets in order that they may increase profits already reasonably
large, we cannot help asking ourselves the question whether the trust as
we see it is not a public enemy; whether it is not teaching the laborer
dangerous lessons; whether it is not, helping to breed anarchy?
Anything in the nature of a trust, that should bring the railroads of the
,country, or of any considerable section of the country under a single head,
with irresistible power to divide business and make rates, would be more to
be dreaded than any other trust ever formed or proposed. The reason is
obvious; it would control more property, have more power of controlling
and coercing the action of individuals and of the public authorities.
No prudent man would give assent to a railroad trust until he was first
shown that very effective legal restraints had been put upon it."
But the process of railway unification goes on seemingly without
hindrance and with rapid strides. Within the past two years not
less than three-fifths of the entire railway mileage of the United
States has been brought under the control of five great capitalists.
What the final outcome is to be no man is wise enough now to
predict.
We have witnessed in the past few years a remarkable industrial
movement in the United States. I refer to the combination or con-
solidation under a single corporate management of a number of
manufacturing plants engaged in the same line of industry. The
census of 19oo shows that 183 corporations controlled 2,147 distinct
plants, and that fifty per cent. of these combinations were organized
between January 1, 1899, and June 30, 19oo. The manufactured
product of these industrial combinations in 19oo was declared by the
census officials to be equivalent to 20.4 per cent. of the total gross
products of the manufacturing industries of the country as they
existed in 189o. The formation of these combinations, and the
organization of the United States Steel Company perfected since
the census statistics were gathered, have given great prominence to
the questions which relate to trusts. The speech which the Presi-
dent of the United States made a few months ago in Minneapolis,
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although he had not then succeeded to the office, is indicative of
a feeling which day by day is becoming more widespread among
our people. He said:
"More and more it is evident that the State, and if necessary
the Nation, has got to possess the right of supervision and control
as regards the great corporations which are its creatures, particularly
the great business corporations which derive a portion of their
importance from the existence of some monopolistic tendency."
That trusts may result in a saving of the wastes of competition
is no doubt a good. Against that good, however, are possible evils
of great magnitude-the evil of stock watering, of high prices to
consumers because of monopolistic power, of low prices to pro-
ducers of raw material which the combination as being the largest
buyer can compel the producer to accept, lower wages to the laborer,
and above all the powerful if not corrupting influence which may
be exerted over political organizations, and over every department
of government, the executive, legislative and judicial.
That the people and their representatives are giving serious con-
sideration to the problem is made evident by the large amount of
legislation respecting corporations which has taken place in this
country within the last few years. Thirty states, within the past
eleven years, have passed laws intended to prevent the industrial
combinations known as "trusts." Some of the number have adopted
constitutional provisions upon the same subject. Congress also has
interfered, enacting in 189o an Anti-Trust law, known as the Sher-
man Act. It seems to be quite generally agreed that the laws already
enacted have had very little practical effect. We are not only con-
cerned as lawyers with what has been enacted, but the opinions of
lawyers will doubtless be potential in determining, perhaps, not what
should be done, but what can constitutionally be done, and what is
within the scope of federal legislation as compared with that of the
States.
The Sherman Act was necessarily confined in its operation to
commerce and trade with foreign nations, between the several States,
and in the Territories. When the Supreme Court came to construe
the act1 it found it inapplicable to the industrial and manufacturing
corporations of the country. The reasons the Court assigned in
support of its conclusion show plainly it is not within the constitu-
tional power of Congress to so amend the act that it can be made
'United States v. Knight, i56 U. S. i (1894).
CORPORA TIONS.
applicable to this class of corporations. The grant to Congress is
a power over commerce and not over manufactures. An attempt
to monopolize the manufacture of an article which may afterwards
become an article of commerce is not an attempt to monopolize com-
merce in that article. Commerce and manufactures are distinct
matters. Commerce only succeeds to that which the manufacturers
produce. Congress may regulate the former, but under the Con-
stitution the regulation of the latter remains with the States. As
the manufacturers of a given article are relatively few while the
dealers in the manufactured product are many a monopoly through
the manufacturers rather than through the dealers is the evil against
which it is most important to guard, and in respect to which the
Sherman Act is, and must remain, ineffective. As construed by the
Supreme Court in 1899 this Act is applicable to agreements or com-
binations which directly operate, not alone upon the manufacture,
but upon the sale, transportation and delivery of an article of inter-
state commerce by preventing or restricting its sale. '
That the laws have had little effect in remedying the evils they
were intended to correct has not been due to their maladministration
by the judiciary. The courts of last resort have not fallen under
the influence of the corporations, but have fearlessly and honestly
administered the law.
The industrial combinations were first organized through
"trusts." Where the end sought was to bring under one
management a number of corporations engaged in the same
business the holders of the stock in each of the constituent
companies placed their stock in the hands of a trustee or board of
trustees, accepting from the latter stock certificates. The trustees
held the legal title to the stock and voted it. They elected the officers
of the constituent corporations, and thus controlled the business of
each of them. They received the dividends on the stock and paid
the dividends on the stock certificates. The courts had no hesitancy
in pronouncing such combinations illegal upon well known principles
of law and without reference to any special or hostile legislative
enactments. The New York Court of Appeals so pronounced in the
case of the Sugar Trust in 189o, ' and the Supreme Court of Ohio in
1892, in that of the Standard Oil Trust. 3
IAddyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211.
2 People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N. Y., 582.
3 State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St., 137.
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This was not all. The courts in a number of cases decided that
the common law made it illegal for a single corporation, authorized
to carry on a particular business and to acquire property in the
State in which it was chartered and elsewhere, to enter into a scheme
of getting into its hands all like properties in the country with a
view of establishing a virtual monopoly of the business. Upon this
principle the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed a judgment of
ouster against the corporation through which the "Whiskey Tiust"
was carrying on its operations.' A like principle was recognized
in Michigan in a case which involved the Diamond Match Trust.2
But the "trusts" thus adjudged illegal found they could organize
under the laws of New Jersey, and hold real and personal prop-
erty and carry on business outside as well as inside that State.
They transferred their property to corporations organized under the
laws of that Commonwealth, and were thus enabled to accomplish
the purposes which the courts of other states had pronounced illegal,
as being in restraint of trade and contrary to the common law. The
corporation laws of that State, which had come to be known as the
"Snug Harbor" of the trusts, offered them among others, the follow-
ing inducements:
i. A New Jersey corporation was given express authority to
purchase, hold and sell the stock or bonds of other corporations of a
similar character. It thus could acquire the control of the property
and business of other corporations.
2. The corporation was under no obligation to make known to
the public the precise condition of its affairs by any published state-
ment, at stated intervals, of the amount of its capital stock actually
paid in, and of its existing debts and assets.
3. No limit to the duration of the corporation was imposed.
4. Express authority was conferred to issue stock in payment for
property purchased, which made it possible to acquire without a cash
payment the property of like corporations.
5. Authority was given to the corporation to lease its property
and franchises to any other corporation.
6. The tax laws were liberal.
7. The statutes relating to conspiracy had been amended so as
to omit all mention of acts injurious to trade or commerce.
Distilling, etc., Co. v. The People, 156 Ill., 448.
'Richardson v. Buhl, 77 Mich., 632 (i889).
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Of all these inducements no doubt the strongest is that which
allows the purchase of the stock of other corporations. It is under
this provision that the Standard Oil Company, the Distilling Com-
pany of America, the United States Steel Company, and other great
trusts organized as New Jersey corporations, are to-day carrying
on successfully their operations.
New Jersey, however, has not been the only State which has
held out inducements in the direction indicated. Delaware, West
Virginia, Maine, and of late New York, have followed the example.
Connecticut has also been sometimes mentioned as among the States
having a liberal policy in this matter, and which are known as
"charter-granting" States. But New Jersey has attracted the largest
corporations, and no doubt has incorporated the greatest number.
At the present time there are said to be more than i5,ooo corpora-
tions in the United States, operating under New Jersey charters, and
having authority to issue stock aggregating nearly $8,ooo,oooooo.
Comparatively few of these are operating in the State itself. Cor-
porations are incorporated within the State to carry on operations
outside the State which they are not at liberty to carry on within
the State. The result is a surplus in its treasury, with no necessity
for State taxes.
Corporations will continue to exist and "trusts" will continue to
be formed. There are careful and profound students of economic
.questions who do not hesitate to say that trusts are the most effective
agencies yet devised for preventing the wastes of competitive pro-
duction, and that their destruction would probably be the death blow
to our hopes for industrial leadership in the international struggle
for future mastery.' They tell us that the possession of vast capital
by productive combinations is a necessity, and that the law should
allow free opportunity for combination, seeing to it that the methods
of combination are "fair, clean, and honorable." In the opinion of
as wise a man as Mr. Justice Brewer, the trusts "have come to
stay." It is not without considerable significance that the legislature
of New York a year ago so changed the laws affecting corpora-
tions in that State that agreements are now authorized for pooling
stock or creating voting trusts, and that the issue of certificates of
beneficial interest in lieu of stock deposited with the trustee and
the purchasers of corporate mortgage bonds are protected under a
provision that a mortgage given by the corporation becomes valid,
See Professor Sherwood's article in The Yale Review, Feb., 19oo, p. 362.
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after it is recorded for a year and the interest is paid thereon, not-
withstanding any irregularity in its execution. The Connecticut
Corporation Act of 19Ol makes provision for the consolidation and
merger of corporations. This legislation indicates that in these two
commonwealths at least the people do not share at the present time
in that fear of corporations which in so many of the States has led
to hostile enactments.
The question before the American people to-day is not one of
suppression, but one of regulation and control. What restraints
should be imposed it is no easy matter as yet to say. But the most
intelligent students of this subject concede that control must be
exercised, and that probably it may best be exercised through a
national corporation law which will subject all corporations to sub-
stantially the same requirements. First and most important of these
should undoubtedly be publicity. The public should, in every
instance, have reliable information as to the amount of the capital
issued, and the amount paid thereon in money, and the arrears,
if any, of calls due. They should know how the corporation has
invested its money, what its assets are, and the amount of its debts,
as well as the names of its stockholders. This information could
not injure a sound corporation, and would afford that protection
against unsound ones to which the public is certainly entitled.
The people of this State have recently voted in favor of a consti-
tutional convention. I venture to think that when that convention
assembles after it has disposed of the perplexing question of repre-
sentation, and comes to the consideration of other important matters
that must receive careful attention, it will find it necessary to give no
little thought and serious study to the subject of corporations. If it
does not it will be distinguished in this respect from every other con-
stitutional convention which has been held in this country during the
last quarter of a century.
When the existing constitution of Connecticut was drafted in
1818 corporations in the United States were few in number and the
necessity of constitutional limitations respecting them had not be-
come manifest. No restraints were then enforced and none after-
wards by constitutional amendment until 1877, since which time no
further restraint has been added. The amendments referred to pro-
hibit any county, city, town or borough from owning the stock or
bonds of any railroad company and from making any donations to
such corporations. The Legislature of Connecticut can still incorpo-
rate by special laws and the charters it grants may be in such terms
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as to preclude subsequent modification in the legislative discretion
The constitutions adopted in New York in 1894, in South Caro-
lina in 1895, in California in 1896, in Delaware in 1897, in Louisiana
in 1898, and that now pending before the people of Alabama' all con-
tain many restraints imposed upon both public and private corpora-
tions.
The American statesman and the American lawyer is no less
concerned over the problems which relate to public corporations.
There are not- a few who deem the government of great cities the
chief problem of civilization. The history of the government of
American cities gives occasion for deep concern to every thoughtful
citizen. City government in the United States is extravagant,.
inefficient, and corrupt. How to remedy these conditions is the
problem which perplexes. In this connection it becomes necessary
to consider whether the control of municipal government and the
responsibility for good or bad administration shall rest with the
people of the municipality or with the legislature. It is a question
of local rule by the people of the locality as against a theory of gov-
ernment of the city by the State. The question of municipal owner-
ship of public institutions is one of great concern to the people who
live in cities. The corporations which control transportation, gas,
electricity, and the telephone in our municipalities have so gained in
power as to overshadow the government of American cities. 2  The
Supreme Court of Illinois has recently rendered a decision sustaining
the issuance of a mandamus to the State Board of Equalization com-
pelling it to assess twenty-three public service corporations in the city
of Chicago, having a capital stock estimated to be worth $368,ooo,ooo,
and which had been exempt from bearing their full share of taxation
for nearly thirty years. Concerning the questions which involve
home rule and municipal ownership the people depend upon the
lawyers for advice. Already some most important decisions have
been rendered in New York and Michigan upon questions of munic-
ipal ownership, and the cases are not a few as to the constitutional
right of local home rule.
The increasing importance to the statesman and the lawyer of
the subject of municipal corporations is revealed by an examination
of the census tables of the United States. In I89O there were in
'The Alabama Constitution has since been adopted.
2 See Atlantic Monthly, April, i9oi, p. 583, Mr. Edwin Burritt Smith's arti-
cle on The Next Step in Municipal Reform.
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this country 7,578 incorporated places, while in i9oo the number
was 1O,6O2. The number of inhabitants living in incorporated
places in 19oo was 35,849,516 as compared with 26,079,828 in 189o.
In the State of New York 47.3 per cent. of the population live in the
city of New York. In 179o the per cent. of the poppulation of the
United States living in cities of 8,ooo inhabitants and over was 3.35;
in 185o, 12.49; in 189o, 28.5; and in IQOO, 32.4.
That municipal corporations, like the ecclesiastical, the eleemosy-
nary and the educational corporations, were known. to the earlier
English law, and the private trading corporation to the much more
modern law, has already been remarked. History shows the exist-
ence of towns and cities at a very early period, and that even
Phoenicia and Egypt were famous for their large and splendid cities.
It is necessary to remember, however, that the towns and cities of
early times did not .possess charters of incorporation. The most
ancient municipal charter of incorporation now extant was granted
by Alfonso V. in lO2O to the city of Leon in Spain, and in England
the charter of Kingston-on-Hull in 18 Henry VI. was the earliest
charter of municipal incorporation granted in England. Before that
time the cities and towns of England possessed only a quasi cor-
porate character.
I have heretofore called attention to the fact that to all the
corporations known to the earlier English law the same principles
were originally applied, and that in course of time differences in the
rules of law applicable to the different kinds of corporations were
developed from the different purposes each was intended to fulfill.
It is not my purpose to remark upon all these differences, although
I shall in conclusion point out in what some of them consist.
i. Membership in private corporations is voluntary, and in public
corporations involuntary. In private corporations membership rests
upon contract. In public corporations it usually is constituted by
living within the municipal limits, and that without regard either
to the wishes of the individual himself, or of his fellow citizens,
who may regard him as a most undesirable acquisition.
It is a curious fact that membership in a public corporation
ever should have been in any way dependent upon membership in
a private corporation, or that the government of public corporations
should have been to any extent in the hands of private corporations.
Yet the history of Europe, of its towns and gilds, proves this was
otice the case. The gilds were private corporations and controlled
the government of medieval towns. Time was when "the citizens
and the gild became identical; and what was gild-law became the
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law of the town."' In the time of Edward II. an ordinance of
London provided that no person, whether an inhabitant of the city
or otherwise, should be admitted to the freedom of the city unless
he were a member of one of the trade gilds. In the 49 th Edward
III. an enactment was passed which transferred the right of election
of all the dignitaries and officers of the city of London from the
ward representatives to the trading gilds or companies. Dr. Albert
Shaw, writing upon Municipal Government in Great Britain, in
speaking of the city of London, declares that the affairs of the
municipal corporation still remain practically in the hands of the
gilds. 2 The members of the gilds once elected the aldermen and
common councilmen as well as the lord mayor, but recent legisla-
tion has made it possible for resident householders to assist in the
election of the aldermen and common councilmen. While the alder-
men elect the lord mayor, they are restricted in their selection to one
out of two named by the gilds.
2. The fundamental proposition which underlies the law of cor-
porations, both public and private, is that legislative sanction is
absolutely essential to lawful corporate existence. The public wel-
fare requires that no corporate powers shall be exercised except for
purposes and under conditions previously determined by the legisla-
ture. While an incorporating act is essential in all cases, the act
cannot alone create a private corporation; the assent of the mem-
bers must be secured. But the incorporating act is alone suffi-
cient to establish a public corporation. In this case the assent of
the individuals affected is not essential.
3. The consolidation of one corporation with another can only
be effected by legislative authority. When this authority has been
conferred the consolidation of one private corporation with another
cannot be accomplished without the unanimous consent of the mem-
bers, in the absence of some previous agreement to the contrary.
But the consolidation of public corporations is within the exclusive
power of the legislature, unless the constitution of the State other-
wise provides.
4. A private corporation's charter is a contract which the legis-
lature cannot impair. The charter of a public corporation is not a
I English Gilds, p. xciii.
2Municipal Government in Great Britain, p. 225, it says: The membership
of the gilds in 1894 was 8.Soo, their property holdings exceeded $ioooooooo, and
their income is said to amount to $S,oooooo. Few of the members have any
connection with the trade to which they belong. There are generals who are
haberdashers, and scientists who are fishmongers.
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contract, and may be amended or repealed by the legislature at its
pleasure.
5. The charter of a private corporation may be forfeited by the
courts upon cause shown. But the courts possess no such power
over the charter of a public corporation.
6. Public corp6rations are created for governmental purposes.
They are agencies of the State in the administration of public affairs,
and are primarily created for the benefit of the State. Private cor-
porations are not primarily created for the benefit of the State, nor
are they intended to aid in the administration of the affairs of the
State. They are intended rather to promote the individual welfare
of the corporators.
7. In the case of private corporations the grant of a corporate
franchise is the grant of a special privilege which presumably has
pecuniary value. To grant it is to prefer over other individuals the
persons to whom the grant is made. It is not in accordance with
our democratic theories that government should confer special favors
on particular individuals. All persons are entitled to equal oppor-
tunities. This is one reason why in many of the States the legisla-
ture is prohibited from incorporating private corporations by special
act, while free from like restraint as respects the incorporation of
those that are public.
8. A private corporation holds its property subject to all the
constitutional guaranties which protect the property of an individual.
But the property which a public corporation holds in its public
capacity is so far subject to legislative control that it may be trans-
ferred to some other agency of government to be used for similar
public purposes; and this can be done without any compensation
to the corporation thus divested of its property against its will.
9. Upon the dissolution of a private corporation having stock-
holders, its property after the payment of its debts is distributed
among its members according to their respective interests. But
upon the dissolution of a public corporation its property passes under
the immediate control of the State.
io. The better opinion is that the legislature cannot delegate
to a private corporation the power to tax.1 But its right to delegate
such power to public corporations is nowhere denied.
lHarward v. St. Clair &c. Drainage Co., 5I Ill. 130, 135. In this case the
court say: "If it be a tax, as in the present instance, to which the persons
who are to pay it have never given their consent, and imposed by persons act-
ing under no responsibility of official position, and clothed with no authority
of any kind by those whom they propose to tax, it is to the extreme of such
tax, misgovernment of the same character as our forefathers thought just cause
of revolution."
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a. The power to tax cannot be used for the benefit of a private
corporation, except it be one which serves, like a ralway, a public
purpose. But the power to tax for the benefit of a public corporation
is everywhere conceded.
b. The taxing power of the Federal Government extends to
the property of private corporations. But that power cannot be
exercised to tax a public corporation created by a State, or the salary
of one of its officers.
c. A State tax law applies alike to the property of individuals
and of private corporations. But it is not to be construed as
applicable to the property of public corporations, unless made so in
express terms.'
ii. A private corporation, as a rule, cannot be authorized under
the power of eminent domain to condemn the property which it
desires to use in the promotion of its purposes. This can be done
only when the corporation, like a railway, serves a public purpose.
But a public corporation may be invested with authority to acquire
through condemnation proceedings whatever property it may need
for municipal purposes.
12. The principle that a contract beyond the scope of the cor-
porate power is void and that those who contract with the corporation
must at their peril inquire into its power or that of its officers to
make the contract, is more strictly applied to public than to private
corporations.
a. The legislature cannot in the case of a private corporation
make a contract for it or compel it to incur indebtedness without
its consent. In the case of a public corporation it may be beyond
the legislative authority to compel it to contract a debt for a strictly
local purpose without its assent. But without such assent it may
be compelled to incur indebtedness for an improvement of a general
and public character.
b. A private corporation has implied authority to borrow
money for purposes properly within the scope of its business.
But the better opinion is that a municipal corporation has no implied
power to borrow money for its ordinary purposes.
c. A private corporation has, in the United States, implied
authority to issue negotiable paper whenever this is an appropriate
iPeople v. Brooklyn Assessors, iii N. Y. 50S.
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means of accomplishing the corporate purposes. But a municipal
corporation has no implied power to issue negotiable paper.'
d. A private corporation, as a general rule, has a right to sell or
mortgage the property it holds for corporate purposes, unless as in
the case of a railroad, it is charged with a public duty. In that case
it cannot alienate the property which is essential to the perform-
ance of that duty. A public corporation, on the other hand, cannot
as a rule sell or mortgage the property which it holds, except that
which it possesses in its private capacity.
13. For its torts a private corporation is liable according to the
principles which determine the liability of a natural person. But
public corporations possess an immunity which is peculiar to them-
selves. Those known as quasi corporations, such as counties, town-
ships and school districts, are not liable for torts except as the liability
is imposed by statute. Those known as municipal corporations
proper are, as a rule, not liable for the torts of agents when acting
in a governmental capacity. This immunity, however, does not
extend to the misfeasance or non-feasance of agents as respects
corporate as distinguished from governmental duties.
A private corporation is liable to exemplary damages. But
it is difficult to conceive of a case in which a municipal corporation
could be liable in a similar manner.
14. The judgment creditor may enforce his judgment against a
private corporation by writ of execution levied upon its property.
But the creditor of a public corporation cannot ordinarily proceed
in a similar manner, as the property which the corporation holds
in its public capacity cannot be taken on execution to satisfy its
debts. His remedy is by mandamus to compel the payment of the
judgment, or a levy of a tax by which the judgment may be satisfied.
15. The statutes of limitation run against a private corporation
as against a natural person. But the better opinion is that such
statutes do not apply to public corporations as respects public rights,
although applicable to rights of a private nature.
In entering upon the duties of this chair I am impressed by the
fact that there are few subjects in the law which present so many
difficulties and concerning which there is so great a conflict in the
decisions as in the law relating to corporations. I am not unmindful
1Brenham v. German American Bank, 144 U. S. 173.
CORP ORATIONS.
of the responsibility which is devolved upon me. Neither am I
insensible to the honor which attaches to a professorship of the law
in one of the oldest and greatest of American universities. We are
told that in the most shining periods of the Roman republic men of
the first distinction taught the science of law openly in their houses
as in so many schools. From that day to this we have the inspira-
tion of the great names of those who in every country of Europe as
well as in the United States have engaged in the teaching of law.
Mr. Justice Wilson of the Supreme Court of the United States in
accepting a professorship of law in the University of Pennsylvania
in 179 o declared: "By my acceptance of this chair, I think I shall
certainly increase my usefulness, without diminishing my dignity as
a judge; and I think, that with equal certainty, I shall, as a judge,
increase my usefulness, I will not say my dignity, in this chair." A
work which has attracted men of the highest eminence and the
greatest gifts, should not be entered upon without a due sense of its
responsibilities and significance, and a determination to discharge
faithfully the duties which the position involves.
